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The Law of Armed Conflict, the Use of Military Force, 
and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force  
 
 May 16, 2013  
Statement for the Record Submitted the Senate Committee on Armed Services  
By  
Rosa Brooks 
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center 
Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow, New America Foundation 
 
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe and members and staff of the Committee on 
Armed Services, thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify today on the law of armed 
conflict, the use of military force, and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF). These are extraordinarily important issues, and I appreciate your commitment to taking 
a fresh look at them. 
 
I am a law professor at Georgetown University, where I teach courses on international 
law, constitutional law and national security issues. I am also a Bernard L. Schwartz Senior 
Fellow at the New America Foundation, and I write a weekly column for Foreign Policy 
magazine. From April 2009 to July 2011, during a public service leave of absence from 
Georgetown, I had the privilege of serving as Counselor to the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Policy at the Department of Defense. This testimony reflects my personal views only, however.  
Mr. Chairman, almost twelve years have gone by since the passage of the AUMF on 
September 14, 2001. The war in Afghanistan – the longest war in U.S. history-- has begun to 
wind down. But at the same time, a far more shadowy war has quietly accelerated.   
I am referring to what many have called the “drone war”: the increased use of military 
force by the United States outside of traditional, territorially bounded battlefields,1 carried out 
primarily, though not exclusively,2 by missile strikes from remotely piloted aerial vehicles.3 In 
recent years this shadowy war has spread ever further from "hot" battlefields, migrating from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I will use the term “hot battlefields” interchangeably with “traditional battlefields,” “traditional territorially bounded 
battlefields” or “active theaters of combat.” The intent is not to assert that there is a clear legal distinction between these concepts 
(that, after all, is part of what is at issue today), but rather to distinguish descriptively between bounded geographical locations in 
which the existence of an armed conflict is legally uncontroversial and universally acknowledged -- such as Afghanistan, or Iraq 
prior the the withdrawal of U.S. troops – and situations in which the existence of an armed conflict and/or the applicability of the 
law of armed conflict is precisely what is controversial. 
2 While drone strikes have garnered the most media attention, most of the analysis in this testimony applies equally to strikes 
carried out by manned aircraft and to strikes or raids that involve “boots on the ground,” such as those carried out by Special 
Operations Forces. 
3 These have variously been termed “drones,” “unmanned aerial vehicles,” and “remotely piloted vehicles.” I will generally use 
the term “drone” as shorthand.  
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Afghanistan and Iraq to Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia, and perhaps to Mali and the Philippines 
as well.4 
As you know, most information about U.S. drone strikes and other U.S. uses of military 
force outside “hot battlefields” remains classified. As a result, virtually all of what is publicly 
known has had to be pieced together from leaked U.S. government documents, court filings,  
NGO and media investigations and occasional statements from government officials of foreign 
states.  Everything in this testimony is therefore subject to the caveat that I can only comment on 
publicly available information, which is inevitably partial and (in some cases potentially 
misleading).  
Subject to that caveat, however, it appears that U.S. drones strikes, which began as a tool 
used in extremely limited circumstances to target specifically identified high-ranking al Qaeda 
officials, have become a tool relied on to go after an ever-lengthening list of bad actors, many of 
whom appear to have only tenuous links to al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks, and many of whom 
arguably pose no imminent threat to the United States. Some of these suspected terrorists have 
been identified by name and specifically targeted, while others have reportedly been targeted 
solely on the basis of behavior patterns deemed suspect by U.S. officials.5  
We also appear increasingly to be targeting militants who are lower and lower down the 
terrorist food chain,6 rather than high-ranking terrorist planners and operatives.7 Although drone 
strikes are thought to have killed well over 3,000 people since 2004,8 analysis by the New 
America Foundation and more recently by the McClatchy newspapers suggests that only a small 
fraction of the dead appear to have been so-called "high-value targets."9   
The increasing use of weaponized drones to target individuals who only tenuous links to 
Al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks raises critical legal and policy questions, particularly when such 
drone strikes occur outside of traditional battlefields. Most pertinently for today’s hearing, such 
strikes raise significant domestic legal questions about whether current U.S. targeted killing 
policy is fully in conformity with Congress’ 2001 Authorization for use of Military Force.  
In my view, current U.S. targeted killing policy has grown increasingly difficult to justify 
under the 2001 AUMF. As I will discuss, however, I believe it is neither necessary nor wise to  
expand the AUMF to give the president broad additional authorities to use force. Expanding the 
AUMF would effectively cede to the executive branch powers our Constitution entrusts to 
Congress. This would undermine the separation of powers scheme so vital to sustaining our 
constitutional democracy, and could easily lead to an irresponsible and unconstrained executive 
branch expansion of what has already been termed “the forever war.”10 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2012/06/did_the_us_launch_a_drone_stri.php 
 and http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/03/05-drones-philippines-ahmed 
5 So called “signature strikes.” 
6 See http://articles.cnn.com/2012-09-05/opinion/opinion_bergen-obama-drone_1_drone-strikes-drone-attacks-drone-program 
7 See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/20/AR2011022002975.html 
8 See http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones 
9 See http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones; http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/04/09/188062/obamas-drone-war-kills-
others.html#.UZF-Xncq9QI; and http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/20/AR2011022002975.html 
10 http://opiniojuris.org/wp-content/uploads/2013-5-7-corrected-koh-oxford-union-speech-as-delivered.pdf 
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Expanding the AUMF is also wholly unnecessary. Even without any AUMF, the 
president already has both the constitutional power and the right under international law to use 
military force to defend the United States from an imminent attack, regardless of whether the 
threat emanates from al Qaeda or from some new and unrelated terrorist organization.   
If Congress chooses to revise the AUMF, it would be far more appropriate to add 
geographic and temporal limitations-- or clarify Congress’ assumptions about the nature of the 
force authorized-- than to expand it.  The 2001 AUMF created a domestic legal framework that 
assumes an indefinitely continuing state of armed conflict and gives the president advance 
authorization to use force more or less as he chooses, without regard to geography and without 
regard to the gravity or imminence of any threats posed to the United States. But as the threat 
posed by Al Qaeda dissipates and U.S. troops begin to withdraw from Afghanistan, it is 
appropriate for the U.S. to transition to a domestic legal framework in which there is a 
heightened threshold for the use of military force.  
Congressional authorization for the president to use military force should be reserved for 
situations in which there is a sustained and intense threat to the United States. If this president or 
any future president identifies a specific new threat of that nature, he can and should provide 
Congress with detailed information about the threat,  and request that Congress authorize the use 
of military force in a manner tailored to address the specific threat posed by a specific state or 
organization.  
In the event that the president becomes aware of a threat so imminent and grave that it is 
not feasible for him to seek Congressional authorization prior to using military force, he can rely 
on his inherent constitutional powers to take appropriate action – by force if needed-- until the 
threat has been dissipated or until Congress can act.  There is simply no need for Congress to 
preemptively authorize the president to use military force indefinitely against inchoate threats 
that have not yet emerged.  
Mr. Chairman, the United States is usually credited with the first modern codification of 
the rules of armed conflict. In 1863, President Abraham Lincoln signed General Order #100, 
“Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field” – better known as 
the Lieber Code – outlining the core rules of armed conflict with which he expected the Union 
Army to comply.  In Article 29, the Lieber Code makes a bold declaration: “Peace is [the] 
normal condition; war is the exception. The ultimate object of all modern war is a renewed state 
of peace.”11 
 
This rings as true today as in 1863, when the U.S. faced a truly existential threat.  And it 
invites us to ask a broad policy question in addition to a legal question: do we want to live in a 
world of perpetual, open-ended war? And if not, how do we begin to turn the page on the 9/11 
era? What Congressional action will ensure that we retain the ability to protect ourselves when 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp 
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necessary, while at the same time ensuring that peace, rather than war, once again becomes our 
norm? 
 
Difficult as this question is, I am certain of one thing: an expanded AUMF will do 
nothing to prevent a “forever war.” On the contrary, it would likely lead only to thoughtless 
further expansion of our current shadowy drone war -- and this, I believe, would both undermine 
the rule of law and represent an act of supreme strategic folly. 
Moving well beyond the issue of the AUMF, U.S. drone strikes outside traditional 
battlefields also raise significant questions about U.S. compliance with international law 
principles, and even about what international legal framework is the appropriate framework for 
evaluating current U.S. targeted killing policy. Is it the international law of armed conflict? The 
international law concerning the right of states to use force in self-defense? International human 
rights law? Some combination of all these, or a different framework depending on the factual 
circumstances unique to each situation?  Even more broadly, current U.S. policy raises grave 
questions about what it means to respect the rule of law when the law itself appears to be 
ambiguous or indeterminate. 
I recently testified at a hearing on “The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications 
of Targeted Killing” held by the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights. In my written statement submitted for the record 
for that April 23 hearing (see Appendix), I addressed a number of broader issues that I believe 
are also of interest to the Committee on Armed Services.   
Specifically, my April 23 testimony discussed what I view as some of the most common 
but unfounded criticisms of U.S. drone strikes, and identified some advantages of using drones as 
weapons delivery systems. I argued that drones present no new legal issues as such, but drone 
technologies lower the perceived costs of using lethal force across borders; as a result, they have 
facilitated a steady expansion of the use of force beyond traditional battlefields, which will likely 
have long-term strategic costs for the United States.  
My April 23 testimony also addressed the significant rule of law challenges posed by 
current U.S. targeted killing policy. I discussed the international legal framework in which U.S. 
drone strikes occur, focusing specifically on the law of armed conflict and the international law 
of self-defense, and arguing that existing international law frameworks offer only ambiguous 
guidance with regard to the legality of U.S. targeted killings. This creates a grave rule of law 
problem: when the legal framework for assessing U.S. targeted killings is uncertain and 
contested, the “legality” of such killings becomes effectively indeterminate. My April 23 
testimony also addressed the question of what precedent U.S. targeted killing policy risks setting 
for other less scrupulous nations, and concluded by highlighting a number of possible ways for 
Congress to ensure that U.S. targeted killing policy does not continue to undermine vital rule of 
law norms.  
Rather than restate these arguments in this testimony prepared for the Committee on 
Armed Services, I will focus today solely on questions relating to the 2001 AUMF. However, I 
am including as an appendix to today’s written testimony the statement I submitted on April 23 
	   5	  
to the Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human 
Rights, and I respectfully request that you consider it part of the record for today’s hearing as 
well.  
 
The 2001 Authorization for use of Military Force  
Mr. Chairman, our Constitution gives Congress vital powers relating to the use of 
military force.  To Congress is given the power to declare war and the power to raise, support 
and make rules regulating the armed forces and to make rules concerning “captures on land and 
water.” To Congress is also given the constitutional power to call forth “the militia to execute the 
laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions,” as well as the power to “define 
and punish… offenses against the law of nations.”  The Constitutional grant of these powers to 
Congress is essential to our scheme of separation of powers, and Congress has rightly been 
vigilant against executive usurpation of its constitutional prerogatives.   
 
The original AUMF was passed on September 14, 2001. It gives the president 
Congressional blessing to 
 
“[U]se all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or 
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the 
United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”12 
 
Mr. Chairman and Senator Inhofe, as you and your colleagues on this committee 
undoubtedly recall, the Bush Administration initially proposed a broader, more open-ended 
AUMF, one that would authorize the use of force to “deter and pre-empt any future acts of 
terrorism or aggression against the United States.”13  But even in those frightening days right 
after the 9/11 attacks—even as bodies continued to be pulled from the rubble of the Pentagon 
and the Twin Towers– Congress refused to give the executive branch what would have amounted 
to an unnecessary and open-ended declaration of permanent war against an inchoate, undefined 
enemy.   
 
Congressional power once ceded to the executive branch tends never to be regained, and 
in 2001, Congress rightly wished to ensure that its authorization to use force would not end up 
eviscerating its vital role in the constitutional scheme.  As a result, the language of the 2001 
AUMF was drafted with great care. The 2001 AUMF is forward looking, insofar as its language 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note). 
13. See 147 CONG. REC. S9950-51 (daily ed., Oct. 1, 2001) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (providing the text of the Administration’s 
initial proposal); see also id. at S9949 (“[T]he use of force authority granted to the president extends only to the perpetrators of 
the September 11 attack. It was not the intent of Congress to give the president unbridled authority . . . to wage war against 
terrorism writ large without the advice and consent of Congress. That intent was made clear when Senators modified the text of 
the resolution proposed by the White House to limit the grant of authority to the September 11 attack.”). 
	   6	  
is focused on prevention rather than retaliation; but it is also backward looking, insofar as force 
is explicitly authorized only against those with responsibility for the 9/11 attacks.   
 
The 2001 AUMF does not authorize the U.S. of military force against every terrorist or 
anti-U.S. extremist the world contains.  Instead, it focuses squarely on those “nations, 
organizations, or persons who specifically “planned, authorized, committed, or aided” the 9/11 
attacks, as well as those who “harbored” such organizations or persons.  
 
The AUMF also does not authorize force for the open-ended purpose of preventing any 
and all future acts of terrorism. Instead, it authorizes force for a limited and defined purpose: “to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, 
organizations or persons.” (emphasis added). This language, on its face, does not authorize the 
use of force for the purpose of preventing terrorist acts not directed against U.S. territory or U.S. 
persons, and it also does not authorize the use of force for the purpose of preventing terrorist 
attacks by nations, organizations or persons who with no culpability for 9/11. Furthermore, as the 
U.S. Supreme Court has several times emphasized, the AUMF must be construed as authorizing 
force only to the degree that it is also consistent with the international laws of war. This in turn 
means that any use of force under the AUMF must be consistent with longstanding law of war 
principles relating to necessity, proportionality, humanity and distinction. 14  
 
For much of the last dozen years, the AUMF provided adequate domestic legal authority 
both for the conflict in Afghanistan and for most U.S. drone strikes outside hot battlefields, since 
most of the individuals targeted in early U.S. strikes were reportedly senior Taliban or Al Qaeda 
operatives.  Early U.S. drone strikes could of course still be criticized on other grounds—as 
strategically foolish, or as lacking in transparency and protections against abuse15 --  but strictly 
from the perspective of domestic authorizing legislation, most of the early U.S. drones strikes 
appeared comfortably within the scope of the congressionally-granted authority to use force. I 
believe that this has changed in the last few years.  
 
The 9/11 attacks have receded into the past, the war in Iraq -- which had its own 
independent AUMF16 -- is over, the war in Afghanistan is winding down, and Al Qaeda no 
longer poses the urgent, intense and sustained threat it posed in September 2001.  As former 
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said in November 2012, the “core” of Al Qaeda has been 
“decimated.”17 In his March 2013 testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
Director of National intelligence James Clapper similarly observed that “core” Al Qaeda has 
been “degraded…to a point that the group is probably unable to carry out complex, large-scale 
attacks in the West.”  
 
This does not, of course, mean that the world no longer contains any terrorists or anti-
U.S. extremists. The world is unfortunately replete with people who resent the United States or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 594–95 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519–21 (2004) (plurality opinion).  
15 See, e.g., Rosa Brooks, Take Two Drones and Call me in the Morning, Foreign Policy, Sept. 12, 2012. Available at 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/12/take_two_drones_and_call_me_in_the_morning 
16 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_Resolution 
17 Hon. Leon Panetta, Sec’y of Def., “The Fight Against Al Qaeda: Today and Tomorrow,” Speech Before the Center for a New 
American Security (Nov. 20, 2012), available at http://www.cfr.org/defense-strategy/panettas-speech-al-qaeda-november-
2012/p29547. 
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oppose U.S. policies. Some subset of those people self-identify with the distorted brand of Islam 
favored by Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and a further subset may be willing to use violence to 
further their ends. 18  
 
Not all these people and organization pose serious or urgent threats to the United States, 
however. I am not privy to classified military or intelligence evaluations of the capabilities of 
foreign terrorist organizations, but publicly available information suggests that while extremists 
and terrorists abound, few have both the intent and the ability to plan and implement actual 
attacks against the United States.   
 
Indeed, in his March 2013 testimony SSCI testimony, DNI James Clapper did not 
highlight any organization known to have both the current intent and the current capacity to carry 
out attacks against the United States.  He noted, for instance, that Al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP) continues to view attacks on U.S. soil as “part of [its] transnational strategy,” 
but he also suggested that AQAP has regional and internal priorities that its leaders may view as 
taking precedence over U.S. operations, given its limited number of “individuals who can 
manage, train, and deploy operatives for U.S. operations.”19 DNI Clapper suggested that other 
known international terrorist organizations are primarily local or regional in their interests and 
reach. Al Qaeda in Iraq’s “goals inside Iraq will almost certainly take precedence over U.S. 
plotting,” while “Somalia-based al-Shabaab will remain focused on local and regional 
challenges.” Clapper offered similar assessments of Syria’s al Nusra Front, Al Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Nigeria’s Boko Haram and Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Tayibba.  
 
 Nevertheless, the publicly available evidence suggests that the United States continues to 
use military force outside hot battlefields not only against the remnants of “core” al Qaeda and 
the Taliban, but also against known or suspected members of other organizations-- including 
Somalia’s al Shabaab -- as well as against individuals identified by U.S. intelligence only as 
“militants,” “foreign fighters” and “unknown extremists.”20 
 
Insofar as such groups and individuals were unconnected to the 9/11 attacks and are not 
planning or carrying out terrorist attacks against the United States, the use of force against these 
groups and individuals– at least outside of traditional battlefields – does not appear to be 
authorized by the 2001 AUMF.  
 
The Obama administration has countered this argument by asserting that insofar as 
Congress intended the AUMF to be the functional equaivalent of a declaration of war, the 
AUMF must be read to include the implied law of war-based authority to target groups that are 
“associates” of Al Qaeda or the Taliban.  
 
However, it is not clear that Congress intended to authorize the use of force outside of 
traditional territorial battlefields against mere “associates” of those responsible for the 9/11 
attacks. It is also not clear how the executive branch defines “associates” of al Qaeda, and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Arguably, post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism policy has increased, rather than decreased, the number of people in this category. 
 
19 http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/130312/clapper.pdf 
20 http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/04/09/188062/obamas-drone-war-kills-others.html#.UZF-Xncq9QI 
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Obama Administration has not offered any public explanation of which groups it considers to be 
“associates” of Al Qaeda or the Taliban. 
 
The international law of war unquestionably permits parties to a conflict to target “co-
belligerents” of the enemy. On a traditional battlefield—such as within the territorial confines of 
Afghanistan— it would clearly be permissible for the U.S. to target individuals and groups that 
are fighting alongside the Taliban or Al Qaeda.21  It is less clear that this is the case outside “hot 
battlefields.” In this murkier context, it is far harder to determine what would constitute “co-
belligerency” with Al Qaeda, and executive branch officials have provided no clear criteria, nor 
even a simple list of those it regards as “associates” under a co-belligerency theory. 
 
As a result, there is a real danger that the Administration’s assertion that the AUMF 
authorizes the use of force against AQ “associates” even outside of traditional battlefields could 
become a backdoor way of expanding the AUMF far beyond Congress’ intent.  
 
As noted earlier, in 2001 Congress refused to acquiesce in Bush Administration proposals 
to that the AUMF authorize force to “deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or 
aggression,” and instead opted for language that was far more specific and limiting. If Congress 
now accepts Obama Administration claims that force can be used against a broad category of 
persons and organizations determined (based on unknown criteria) to be AQ “associates,” this 
would effectively turn the AUMF into precisely the open-ended authorization to use force that 
Congress chose to avoid in 2001. 
 
Congress bears some responsibility for enabling the executive branch to assert such 
virtually unlimited authority to use force, however. In the 2006 and 2009 Military	  Commissions	  Acts, for instance, Congress gave military commissions jurisdiction over individuals who are 
“part of forces associated with Al Qaeda or the Taliban,” along with “those who purposefully 
and materially support such forces in hostilities against U.S. Coalition partners.”22  
 
This allowed the Bush Administration and later the Obama Administration to argue that 
if Congress considers it appropriate for U.S. military commissions to have jurisdiction over AQ 
and Taliban associates—including over those “associates” who were detained in geographical 
locations far from traditional battlefields--  Congress must believe the executive branch has the 
authority to detain such associates found far from traditional battlefields, and the authority to 
detain must stem from the authority to use force.  Indeed, by 2009 the Obama Administration 
was arguing in court that at least when it comes to detention, the AUMF implicitly authorizes 
the president “to detain persons who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida 
forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition 
partners.”23 (My emphasis).   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Indeed, the AUMF notwithstanding, the U.S. would be justified under international self-defense principles in using force 
against persons or organizations posing an imminent threat to U.S. personnel, subject to the principles of necessity and 
proportionality.  
 
22 See, e.g, Military Commissions Act of 2006 (2006 MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 
2241) 
23 http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf 
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But note how far this has shifted from the original language of the AUMF: at least with 
regard to detention, the administration’s focus is no longer merely on those who were directly 
complicit in the 9/11 attacks, but on a far broader category of individuals. This broadened 
understanding of executive detention authority was later given the congressional nod in the 2012 
NDAA, which used virtually identical language.24 
 
The key subsequent move in the executive branch’s gradual expansion of the scope of the 
2001 AUMF was the conflation of detention authority with the authority to target using lethal 
force. Logically, as the Supreme Court noted in 2004,25 a party to a conflict must have the 
power to lawfully detain all persons it has the lawful power to kill. The greater power must 
include the lesser: if it would be lawful to shoot an enemy combatant, it must be lawful to 
capture and hold him instead.  Working backward from this principle, the Obama Administration 
appears to have reasoned that if it is lawful to detain an individual, it is equally lawful to use 
force against him.  
 
This does not follow: while the existence of the greater power implies the existence of the 
lesser power, Congressional authorization of the lesser power (detention) should not be 
construed – in the absence of express, unambiguous manifestations of Congressional intent-- to 
include Congressional authorization of the greater power (the use of military force to target and 
kill “associates” of Al Qaeda). However, Congress’ failure to clarify its intent with regard to the 
AUMF has enabled the executive to read Congressional silence as approval. 
 
Notwithstanding executive branch efforts to shoehorn the vague category of “associates” 
into the AUMF, few would dispute that as the “drone war” expands, it has become more and 
more difficult to view all current Obama administration uses of force as congruent with the 
limited authorities granted by Congress on September 14, 2011. In February 2012, then-
Pentagon General Counsel Jeh Johnson insisted that the 2001 AUMF remains the domestic legal 
“bedrock” of the military’s drone strikes,26 and Administration representatives have repeatedly 
affirmed this view.  But as a recent Hoover Institution white paper authored by former Obama 
official Bobby Chesney, former Bush officials Jack Goldsmith and Matt Waxman and the 
Brookings Institution’s Ben Wittes concludes, “in a growing number of circumstances, drawing 
the requisite connection to the AUMF requires an increasingly complex daisy chain of 
associations—a task that is likely to be very difficult… in some cases, and downright impossible 
in others.”27  
 
John Bellinger, former State Department Legal Advisor under President Bush, is equally 
blunt: the AUMF is “getting a little long in the tooth.” Like it or not, the language of the AUMF 
is still clearly “tied to the use of force against the people who planned, committed, and or aided 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See FY2012 NDAA § 1021(b)(2), 125 Stat. at 1562 (authorizing detention of “A person who was a part of or substantially 
supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition 
partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy 
forces”). 
25Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-6696.ZS.html 
26 http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627 
27 Robert Chesney et al., Hoover Inst., A Statutory Framework for Next-Generation Terrorist Threats (2013), 
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Statutory-Framework-for-Next-Generation-Terrorist-Threats.pdf. 
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those involved in 9/11," says Bellinger. "The farther we get from [targeting] al-Qaeda, the harder 
it is to squeeze [those operations] into the AUMF." 28 
 
If the Administration’s use of force outside traditional battlefields is increasingly hard to 
justify under the AUMF, what should Congress do in response?  
 
Congress could, of course, choose to do in 2013 what it refused to do in 2001, and 
broaden the existing AUMF to expressly permit the executive branch to use force to deter or 
preempt any future attacks or aggression towards the United States or U.S. interests. But such an 
expansion of the AUMF would give this and all future Administrations virtual carte blanche to 
wage perpetual war against an undefined and infinitely malleable list of enemies, without any 
time limits or geographical restrictions.   
 
In my view, this would amount to an unprecedented abdication of Congress’s 
constitutional responsibilities.  In effect, Congress would be delegating its war powers almost 
wholesale to the executive branch. And while such a broad authorization to use military force 
could in theory be narrowed or withdrawn by a subsequent Congress, history suggests that the 
expansion of executive power tends to be a one-way ratchet: power, once ceded, is rarely 
regained. 
 
Mr. Chairman, my guess is that few members of this committee would wish to 
contemplate such a broadened AUMF. What is more, it is worth emphasizing once again that 
while the Bush administration requested such open-ended authority to use force immediately 
after 9/11, Congress refused to provide it – even at a moment when the terrorist threat to the 
United States was manifestly more severe than it is now.  
 
Today, the Obama Administration has not requested or suggested that it sees any need for 
an expanded AUMF. It would be utterly unprecedented for Congress to give the executive 
branch a statutory authorization to use force when the president has not requested it. 
 
Similar flaws characterize proposals to revise the AUMF to permit the president to use 
force against any organizations he may, in the future, specifically identify as posing a threat  to 
the United States, based on criteria established by Congress. This is the proposal made by the 
Hoover Institute White Paper co-authored by my colleague Jack Goldsmith. He and his co-
authors argue that Congress could pass a revised AUMF containing “general statutory criteria for 
presidential uses of force against new terrorist threats but requir[ing] the executive branch, 
through a robust administrative process, to identify particular groups that are covered by that 
authorization of force.”  
 
While it would surely be useful for Congress to provide greater clarity on what, in its 
view, constitutes a threat sufficient to justify the open-ended use of military force -- amounting 
to a declaration of armed conflict-- such a revised AUMF would still effectively delegate to the 
president constitutional powers properly entrusted to Congress. Once delegated, these powers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/administration-debates-stretching-911-law-to-go-after-new-al-qaeda-
offshoots/2013/03/06/fd2574a0-85e5-11e2-9d71-f0feafdd1394_print.html 
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would be difficult for Congress to meaningfully oversee or dial back—and, once again, it is 
notable that the president has not requested such a power.   
   
Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, if what we’re concerned about is protecting the nation, 
there is no need for an expanded AUMF. With or without the 2001 AUMF, no one disputes that 
the president has the constitutional authority (and the international law authority) to use military 
force if necessary to defend the United States from an imminent attack, regardless of whether the 
threat emanates from al Qaeda or from some as yet unimagined terrorist organization.   
 
If Congress chooses to revise the AUMF, it would be far more appropriate to limit it than 
to expand it.  The 2001 AUMF established – at least as a matter of domestic U.S. statutory law-- 
an indefinitely continuing state of armed conflict between the United States, on the one hand, 
and those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, on the other hand. This has enabled the executive 
branch to argue (both as a matter of U.S. law and international law) that it is the principles of the 
law of armed conflict (LOAC) that should govern the U.S. use of armed force for counter-
terrorism purposes. But if the law of armed conflict is the applicable legal framework through 
which to understand the AUMF and through which to evaluate U.S. drone strikes outside of 
traditional battlefields, there are very few constraints on the U.S. use of armed force, and no 
obvious means to end the conflict. 
Compared to other legal regimes, including both domestic law enforcement rules and the 
international law on self defense, the law of armed conflict is extremely permissive with regard 
to the use of armed force. The law of armed conflict permits the targeting both of enemy 
combatants and their co-belligerents. It also allows enemy combatants to be targeted by virtue of 
their status, rather than their activities: it is permissible to target enemy combatants while they 
are sleeping, for instance, even though they pose no “imminent’ threat while asleep, and the 
lowest-ranking enemy soldier can be targeted just as lawfully as the enemy’s senior-most 
military leaders. Indeed, uniformed cooks and clerks with no combat responsibilities can be 
targeted along with combat troops.  
It is this highly permissive law of armed conflict framework that has enabled the 
executive branch to assert that “associates” of al Qaeda and the Taliban may be targeted beyond 
traditional battlefields, even though this expansion of the use of force beyond those responsible 
for 9/11was not contemplated by Congress in the 2001 AUMF. Similarly, it is the law of armed 
conflict framework that has permitted the executive branch to assert the authority to target ever 
lower-level terrorists and suspected “militants,” rather than  restricting drone strikes to those 
targeting the most dangerous “senior” operatives. It is also the law of armed conflict framework 
that permits the executive branch to assert that it may target even those individuals and 
organizations that pose no imminent threat to the United States, in the normal sense of the word 
“imminent.”  
But as the threat posed by Al Qaeda dissipates and U.S. troops withdraw from 
Afghanistan, it is appropriate for the U.S. to transition to a domestic (and international) legal 
framework in which there are tighter constraints on the use of military force. Congress can help 
this transition along by clarifying that the existing AUMF is not an open-ended mandate to wage 
a “forever war,” and requiring the president to satisfy more exacting legal standards before 
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military force is authorized or used. 
In the event that the president becomes aware of a threat so imminent and grave he 
cannot wait for Congressional authorization prior to using military force, there is no dispute that 
he can rely on his inherent constitutional powers to take appropriate action until the threat has 
been eliminated or until Congress can act. However, by expressly granting the power to declare 
war and associated powers to Congress, our Constitution presumes that the president will only in 
rare circumstances rely solely on his inherent executive powers to use military force. 
Historically, non-congressionally authorized uses of force by the president have generally been  
reserved for rare and unusual circumstances, and this is as it should be.  
Beyond these rare situations of extreme urgency, if the president believes that there is a 
sustained and intense threat to the United States, he can and should provide Congress with 
detailed information about the threat, and request that Congress authorize the use of military 
force to address the specific threat posed by a specific state or organization.  
Congress should authorize the use of military force in these circumstances only -- there is 
no need for Congress to preemptively authorize the president to use military force indefinitely 
against unspecified threats that the president has not yet identified. And if Congress does 
authorize the use of military force at the president’s request, the force authorized should be 
carefully tailored to the specific threat. Furthermore, Congress should be explicit about whether 
an AUMF is acknowledging or authorizing an ongoing armed conflict, on the one hand, or 
whether it is simply authorizing the limited use of force for self-defense, on the other hand.  
International law imposes criteria for the use of force in national self-defense that are far 
more stringent than the criteria for using force in the course of an armed conflict that is ongoing. 
Unlike the international law of armed conflict, the international law of self-defense permits states 
to use force only to respond to an armed attack or to prevent an imminent armed attack, and the 
use of force in self defense is subject to the principles of necessity and proportionality. Under 
self defense rules (unlike law of armed conflict rules) individuals who pose no imminent threat 
cannot be targeted, and inquiries into imminence, necessity and proportionality tend to restrict 
the use of force in self defense to strikes against those who— by virtue of their operational 
seniority or hostile activities- pose threats that are urgent and grave, rather than speculative, 
distant or minor. 
 
 For this reason, I believe that if Congress wishes to refine or clarify the AUMF, it should 
consider limiting the AUMF’s geographic scope, limiting its temporal duration, limiting the 
authorized use of force to that which would be considered permissible self defense under 
international law, or all three.  
 
 Expressly limiting the AUMF’s geographic scope to Afghanistan and/or other areas in 
which U.S. troops on the ground are actively engaged in combat, for instance, would clarify that 
the ongoing armed conflict (and the applicability of the law of armed conflict) is limited to these 
more traditional battlefield situations. As noted above, such a geographical limitation would by 
no means undermine the president’s ability to use force to protect the United States from threats 
emanating from outside of the specified region. Such a geographical limitation would merely 
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make it clear that any presidential desire to use force elsewhere would require him either to 
request an additional narrowly drawn congressional authorization to use force, or would require 
that any non-congressionally authorized use of force be justified --  constitutionally and 
internationally – on self defense grounds, by virtue of the gravity and imminence of a specific 
threat. 
 
 Limiting the AUMF’s temporal scope could be accomplished by adding a “sunset” 
provision to the AUMF. The current AUMF could be set to expire when U.S. troops cease 
combat operations in Afghanistan, for instance, or in 2015, whichever date comes first. Here 
again, such a limitation would not preclude the president from requesting an extension or a new 
authorization to use force, if clearly justified by specific circumstances, nor would it preclude the 
president from relying on his inherent constitutional powers if force becomes necessary to 
prevent an imminent attack. 
 
 Finally, the AUMF could be revised to clarify Congress’ view of the applicable legal 
framework. Congress could state explicitly that it authorizes the president to engage in an 
ongoing armed conflict within the borders of Afghanistan between the U.S. and Al Qaeda, the 
Taliban and their co-belligerents, but that it does not currently authorize the initiation or 
continuation of an armed conflict in any other place, and expects therefore that any U.S. military 
action elsewhere or against other actors shall be governed by principles of self-defense rather 
than by the law of armed conflict. 
 
 There are many possible ways for Congress to signal its commitment to preventing the 
AUMF from being used to justify a “forever war.” Each of these approaches has both benefits 
and drawbacks, and each would require significant further discussion. But I believe that 
Congress’ focus should be on ensuring that war remains an exceptional state of affairs, not the 
norm. At a minimum, this should preclude any Congressional expansion of existing AUMF 
authorities. 
 
 
 Mr. Chairman, let me close with a plea for perspective. We live in a dangerous world: 
adversarial states such as North Korea and Iran remain bellicose; the changing role of near-peer 
powers such as China and Russia poses challenges to U.S. interests and global stability; the 
Middle East remains awash in violence, and technological advances could place lethal tools in 
the hands of irresponsible actors. We also face unprecedented challenges from our increased 
global interdependence: climate change, the interdependence of global financial systems and our 
ever-increasing reliance on the internet all create new vulnerabilities. Against the backdrop of 
these many dangers, old and new, the fear of terrorist attack should not be the primary driver of 
U.S. national security policy.  
 
Terrorism is a very real problem, and we cannot ignore it, any more than we should 
ignore violent organized crime or large-scale public health threats. Like everyone else, I worry 
about terrorists getting ahold of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, we should 
recognize that terrorism is neither the only threat nor the most serious threat the U.S. faces.29 
With the sole exception of 2001, terrorist groups worldwide have never succeeded in killing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/04/fp_survey_future_of_war 
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more than a handful of Americans citizens in any given year. According to the State	  Department,  seventeen American citizens were killed by terrorists in 2011, for instance. The 
terrorist death toll was fifteen in 2010 and nine in 2009.30 
 
These deaths are tragedies, and we should continue to strive to prevent such deaths—but 
we should also keep the numbers in perspective. On average, about 55 Americans are killed by 
lightning strikes each year,31 and ordinary criminal homicide claims about 16,000 U.S. victims 
each year.32 No one, however, believes we need to give the executive branch extraordinary legal 
authorities to keep Americans from venturing out in electrical storms, or use armed drones to 
preemptively kill homicide suspects. 
 
What’s more, we should keep in mind that military force is not the only tool in the U.S. 
arsenal against terrorism.33 Since 9/11, we’ve gotten far more effective at tracking terrorist 
activity, disrupting terrorist communications	  and	  financing, catching terrorists and convicting 
them in civilian	  courts,34 and a wide range of other counterterrorism measures. Much of the 
time,  these non-lethal approaches to counterterrorism are as effective as targeted killings. And in 
fact, there’s growing reason to fear that the expansion of U.S. drone strikes is strategically 
counterproductive.   
 
Former vice-chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright recently 
expressed concern that as a result of U.S. drone strikes, the U.S. may have “ceded some of our 
moral high ground.”35 Retired General Stanley	  McChrystal	  has expressed similar concerns: 
“The resentment created by American use of unmanned strikes… is much greater than the 
average American appreciates. They are hated on a visceral level, even by people who’ve never 
seen one or seen the effects of one,” and fuel “a perception of American arrogance.” 36 Former 
Director of National Intelligence Dennis	  Blair	  agrees: the U.S. needs to “pull back on unilateral 
actions… except in extraordinary circumstances,” Blair told CBS news in January. U.S. drone 
strikes are “alienating the countries concerned [and] …threatening the prospects for long-term 
reform raised by the Arab Spring…. [U.S. drone strategy has us] walking out on a thinner and 
thinner ledge and if even we get to the far extent of it, we are not going to lower the fundamental 
threat to the U.S. any lower than we have it now.”37 
 
Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, I believe it is past time for a serious overhaul of U.S. 
counterterrorism strategy. This needs to include a rigorous	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis of U.S. drone 
strikes, one that takes into account issues both of domestic legality and international legitimacy, 
and evaluates the impact of targeted killings on regional stability, terrorist recruiting, extremist 
sentiment, and the future behavior or powerful states such as Russia and China. If we undertake 
such a rigorous cost-benefit analysis, I suspect we may come to see scaling back on kinetic 
counterterrorism activities less as an inconvenience than as a strategic necessity—and we may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/index.htm 
31 http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/weather/news/story/2012-01-09/lightning-deaths-storms-weather/52504754/1 
32 http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_06.pdf 
33 http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf 
34 http://www.justice.gov/cjs/ 
35 http://m.npr.org/news/Politics/178753575?textSize=small 
36 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/9787912/Stanley-McChrystal-criticises-reliance-on-drones-as-
strikes-hit-Pakistan.html 
37 http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0711/60199.html#ixzz2NUC4UwYa 
	   15	  
come to a new appreciation of counterterrorism measures that don’t involve missiles raining 
from the sky. 
 
This doesn’t mean we should never use military force against terrorists. In some 
circumstances, military force will be justifiable and useful. But it does mean we should 
rediscover a long-standing American tradition: reserving the use of exceptional legal authorities 
for rare and exceptional circumstances.  
 
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 
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Chairman Durbin, Ranking Member Cruz, members and staff of the subcommittee, thank 
you for giving me the opportunity to testify today about the constitutional and counterterrorism 
implications of U.S. drone wars and targeted killing policy. I appreciate your commitment to 
fostering a rigorous and transparent dialogue on this tough issue. 
I am currently a Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, where I teach 
courses on international law, constitutional law and national security issues. I am also a Bernard 
L. Schwartz Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation, and I write a weekly column for 
Foreign Policy magazine. From April 2009 to July 2011, during a public service leave of 
absence from Georgetown, I had the privilege of serving as Counselor to the Undersecretary of 
Defense for Policy at the Department of Defense. This testimony reflects my personal views 
only, however.  
Mr. Chairman, the mere mention of drones tends to arouse strong emotional reactions on 
both sides of the political spectrum, and last week’s tragic events in Boston have raised the 
temperature still further.  Some demonize drones, denouncing them for causing civilian deaths or 
enabling long-distance, “video game-like” killing, even as they ignore the fact that the same (or 
worse) could equally be said of many other weapons delivery systems. Others glorify drones, 
viewing them as a low- or no-cost way to “take out terrorists” wherever they may be found, with 
little regard for broader questions of strategy or the rule of law.  
I believe it is important to take a closer look both at what is and what isn’t new and 
noteworthy about drone technologies and the activities they enable. Ultimately, “drones” as such 
present us with few new issues—but the manner in which the United States has been using drone 
strikes raises serious questions about their strategic efficacy and unintended consequences. Just 
as troubling -- particularly with regard to this subcommittee’s mandate -- the legal theories used 
by the Obama Administration to justify many U.S. drone strikes risk undermining the rule of 
law.  
It does not have to be this way, however. I believe that the president and Congress can 
and should take action to place U.S. targeted killing policy on firmer legal ground, and at the end 
of this testimony I will offer some suggestions for how this might be accomplished. 
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In the first part of this testimony, I will first address some of the most common but 
unfounded criticisms of U.S. drone strikes. In the second section, I will discuss some of the 
perceived advantages of drones, focusing on the ways in which drone technologies lower the 
cost of using lethal force across borders. In the third section, I will highlight some of the strategic 
costs of current U.S. drone policy. In the fourth section, I will first discuss the concept of the rule 
of law and the legal framework in which U.S. drone strikes occur, then look specifically at the 
law of armed conflict and finally at the international law of self-defense, highlighting the ways in 
which existing legal frameworks offer only ambiguous guidance with regard to the legality of 
U.S. targeted killings. In the fifth section, I will briefly address the question of what precedent 
U.S. targeted killing policy is setting for other nations. In the sixth and final section, I will turn to 
the question of reform. While it is beyond the scope of this testimony to fully examine the many 
possible routes to improving oversight and accountability, I will briefly highlight a number of 
possible ways for Congress to ensure that U.S. targeted killing policy does not undermine rule of 
law norms. 
 
1. What’s not wrong with drones 
Many of the most frequently heard criticisms of drones and drone warfare do not hold up 
well under serious scrutiny – or, at any rate, there’s nothing uniquely different or worse about 
drones, compared to other military technologies.  Consider the most common anti-drone 
arguments. 
First, critics often assert that U.S. drone strikes are morally wrong because the kill 
innocent civilians. This is undoubtedly both true and tragic -- but it is not really an argument 
against drone strikes as such. War kills innocent civilians, period. But the best available evidence 
suggests that U.S. drone strikes kill civilians at no higher a rate, and almost certainly at a lower 
rate, than most other common means of warfare.   
Much of the time, the use of drones actually permits far greater precision in targeting than 
most traditional manned aircraft. Today's unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can carry very small 
bombs that do less widespread damage, and UAVs have no human pilot whose fatigue might 
limit flight time. Their low profile and relative fuel efficiency combines with this to permit them 
to spend more time on target than any manned aircraft. Equipped with imaging technologies that 
enable operators even thousands of miles away to see details as fine as individual faces, modern 
drone technologies allow their operators to distinguish between civilians and combatants far 
more effectively than most other weapons systems. 
That does not mean civilians never get killed in drone strikes. Inevitably, they do, 
although the covert nature of most U.S. strikes and the contested environment in which they 
occur makes it impossible to get precise data on civilian deaths. This lack of transparency 
inevitably fuels rumors and misinformation. However, several credible organizations have 
sought to track and analyze deaths due to U.S. drone strikes. The British Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism analyzed examined reports by "government, military and intelligence officials, and 
by credible media, academic and other sources," for instance, and came up with a range, 
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suggesting that the 344 known drone strikes in Pakistan between 2004 and 2012 killed between 
2,562 and 3,325 people, of whom between 474 and 881 were likely civilians.38 (The numbers for 
Yemen and Somalia are more difficult to obtain.) The New America Foundation, with which I 
am affiliated, came up with slightly lower numbers, estimating that U.S. drone strikes killed 
somewhere between 1,873 and 3,171 people overall in Pakistan, of whom between 282 and 459 
were civilians. 39 
Whether drones strikes cause "a lot" or "relatively few" civilian casualties depends what 
we regard as the right point of comparison.  Should we compare the civilian deaths caused by 
drone strikes to the civilian deaths caused by large-scale armed conflicts? One study by the 
International Committee for the Red Cross found that on average, 10 civilians died for every 
combatant killed during the armed conflicts of the 20th century.40 For the Iraq War, estimates 
vary widely; different studies place the ratio of civilian deaths to combatant deaths anywhere 
between 10 to 1 and 2 to 1.41 
The most meaningful point of comparison for drones is probably manned aircraft. It's 
extraordinarily difficult to get solid numbers here, but one analysis published in the Small Wars 
Journal suggested that in 2007 the ratio of civilian to combatant deaths due to coalition air 
attacks in Afghanistan may have been as high as 15 to 1.42 More recent UN figures suggest a far 
lower rate, with as few as one civilian killed for every ten airstrikes in Afghanistan.43 But drone 
strikes have also gotten far less lethal for civilians in the last few years: the New America 
Foundation concludes that only three to nine civilians were killed during 72 U.S. drone strikes in 
Pakistan in 2011, and the 2012 numbers were also low.44  In part, this is due to technological 
advances over the last decade, but it's also due to far more stringent rules for when drones can 
release weapons.  
Few details are known about the precise targeting procedures followed by either U.S. 
armed forces or the Central Intelligence Agency with regard to drone strikes. The Obama 
Administration is reportedly finalizing a targeted killing “playbook,”45 outlining in great detail 
the procedures and substantive criteria to be applied. I believe an unclassified version of this 
should be should be made public, as it may help to diminish concerns reckless or negligent 
targeting decisions. Even in the absence of specific details, however, I believe we can have 
confidence in the commitment of both military and intelligence personnel to avoiding civilian 
casualties to the greatest extent possible. The Obama Administration has stated that it regards 
both the military and the CIA as bound by the law of war when force is used for the purpose of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/ 
39 http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones 
40 See http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/23/world/middleeast/23casualties.html?_r=3 ; www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-
872-wenger-mason.pdf 
41 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Iraq_War 
42 See http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/close-air-support-and-civilian-casualties-in-afghanistan 
43 See http://www.navytimes.com/article/20130219/NEWS/302190304/U-N-Afghan-civilian-deaths-in-airstrikes-down; 
http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=12254&ctl=Details&mid=15756&ItemID=36445&language=en-U.S. 
44 See http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones 
45 See http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-24/world/35499428_1_drone-strikes-brennan-obama-administration; 
http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/has-obama-gone-too-far-with-his-drone-policies/brennan-and-obamas-drone-playbook-
must-be-debated-publicly 
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targeted killing.46 (I will discuss the applicable law of war principles in section IV of this 
statement). What is more, the military is bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice.  
Concern about civilian casualties is appropriate, and our targeting decisions, however 
thoughtfully made, are only as good as our intelligence—and only as wise as our overall 
strategy. Nevertheless, there is no evidence supporting the view that drone strikes cause 
disproportionate civilian casualties relative to other commonly used means or methods of 
warfare. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that if the number of civilian casualties is our 
metric, drone strikes do a better job of discriminating between civilians and combatants than 
close air support or other tactics that receive less attention.  
Critics of U.S. drone policy also decry the fact that drones enable U.S. personnel to kill 
from a safe distance, which seems to be viewed as somehow “unsavory.” But long-distance 
killing” is neither something to automatically condemn nor something unique to drone 
technologies.  Military commanders naturally seek ways to kill enemies without risking the lives 
of our own troops – and if drone technologies enable us to reduce the danger to our own 
personnel, all things being equal this is surely a good thing, not a bad thing. No one would argue 
that we should strip troops of body armor just to level the playing field.  
It is also important to consider drone strikes in the context of the evolution of warfare. 
After all, drones are hardly the only technology that has facilitated killing from a distance. In this 
sense, drones don't present any "new" issues not already presented by aerial bombing -- or by 
guns or bows and arrows, for that matter. The crossbow and later the long bow were considered 
immoral in their day. In 1139, the Second Lateran Council of Pope Innocent II is said to have 
"prohibit[ed] under anathema that murderous art of crossbowmen and archers, which is hateful to 
God.”47 In the early 1600s, Cervantes took a similar view of artillery, which he called a "devilish 
invention" allowing "a base cowardly hand to take the life of the bravest gentleman," with bullets 
coming –like drones-- “nobody knows how or from whence."48 
Other critics have decried what they called "the PlayStation mentality" created by drone 
technologies. I cannot see, however, that drones any more "video game-like" than, say, having 
cameras in the noses of cruise missiles. Regardless, there's little evidence that drone technologies 
"reduce" their operators' awareness of human suffering. If anything, drone operators may be far 
more keenly aware of the suffering they help inflict than any sniper or bomber pilot could be, 
precisely because the technology enables such clear visual monitoring. Increasingly, there is 
evidence that drone pilots, just like combat troops, can suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder. 
A recent Air Force study found that 29 percent of drone pilots suffered from "burnout," with 17 
percent "clinically distressed."49 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf 
47 See http://www.ewtn.com/library/COUNCILS/LATERAN2.HTM 
48See JFC Fuller, Armament and History: The Influence of Armament on History from the Dawn of Classical Warfare to the End 
of the Second World War, 1998, at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=hECRavhisUIC&pg=PA91&lpg=PA91&dq=cervantes+artillery+base+devilish&source=bl&o
ts=ZlFDFmgJuh&sig=2E4lVzuBqOREKoVokbnfUpRG3fs&hl=en" \l 
"v=onepage&q=cervantes%20artillery%20base%20devilish&f=false 
49 See http://www.npr.org/2011/12/19/143926857/report-high-levels-of-burnout-in-u-s-drone-pilots 
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2. The perceived advantages of drone strikes 
For every critic who demonizes drones while ignoring their similarities to other less-
demonized technologies, there are as many others who seem to regard drones as a near-panacea – 
an almost magical new technology that will allow us to economically stave off foreign threats 
from the comfort and safety of home – or even, perhaps, find some new “fix” to the thorny 
problems posed by “homegrown” attacks such as those on the Boston Marathon. 
But the advantages of drones are as overstated and misunderstood as the problems they 
pose—and in some ways, their very perceived advantages cause new problems. Drone 
technologies temptingly lower or disguise the costs of lethal force, but their availability can blind 
us to the potentially dangerous longer-term costs and consequences of our strategic choices. 
Armed drones lower the perceived costs of using lethal force in at least three ways. First, 
drones reduce the dollar cost of using lethal force inside foreign countries.50 Most drones are 
economical compared with the available alternatives.51 Manned aircraft, for instance, are quite 
expensive:52 Lockheed Martin's F-22 fighter jets cost about $150 million each; F-35s are $90 
million; and F-16s are $55 million. But the 2011 price of a Reaper drone was approximately 
$28.4 million, while Predator drones cost only about $5 million to make.53As with so many 
things, putting a dollar figure on drones is difficult; it depends what costs are counted, and what 
time frame is used. Nevertheless, drones continue to be perceived as cheaper by government 
decision-makers.  
Second, relying on drone strikes rather than alternative means reduces the domestic 
political costs of using lethal force. Sending manned aircraft or special operations forces after a 
suspected terrorist places the lives of U.S. personnel at risk, and full-scale invasions and 
occupations endanger even more American lives. In contrast, using armed drones eliminates all 
short-term risks to the lives of U.S. personnel involved in the operations.  
Third, by reducing accidental civilian casualties,54 precision drone technologies reduce 
the perceived moral and reputational costs of using lethal force.  The U.S. government is 
extraordinarily concerned about avoiding unnecessary civilian casualties, and rightly so. There 
are moral and legal reasons for this concern, and there are also pragmatic reasons: civilian 
casualties cause pain and resentment within local populations and host-country governments and 
alienate the international community.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 See https://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom- 
Australia/Local%20Assets/Documents/Industries/Government%20Services/Public%20Sector/Deloitte_DefenseUAV_DI_CaseSt
udy_2Apr2012.pdf 
51 See http://www.economist.com/node/14299496 
52 See http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/180677.pdf 
53 See http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2012/February/Pages/AirForceF-
35s,DronesMaySquareOffinBudgetBattle.aspx 
54 See http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/sunday-review/the-moral-case-for-drones.html 
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It is of course not a bad thing to possess military technologies that are cost little, protect 
American lives and enable us to minimize civilian casualties. When new technologies appear to 
reduce the costs of using lethal force, however, the threshold for deciding to use lethal force 
correspondingly drops, and officials will be tempted to use lethal force with greater frequency 
and less wisdom. 
Over the last decade, we have seen U.S. drone strikes evolve from a tool used in 
extremely limited circumstances to go after specifically identified high-ranking al Qaeda 
officials to a tool relied on in an increasing number of countries to go after an eternally 
lengthening list of putative bad actors, with increasingly tenuous links to grave or imminent 
threats to the United States. Some of these suspected terrorists have been identified by name and 
specifically targeted, while others are increasingly targeted on the basis of suspicious behavior 
patterns. 
Increasingly, drones strikes have targeted militants who are lower and lower down the 
terrorist food chain,55 rather than terrorist masterminds.56 Although drone strikes are believed to 
have killed more than 3,000 people since 2004,57 analysis by the New America Foundation and 
more recently by a the McClatchy newspapers suggests that only a small fraction of the dead 
appear to have been so-called "high-value targets."58 What’s more, drone strikes have spread 
ever further from "hot" battlefields, migrating from Pakistan to Yemen to Somalia (and perhaps 
to Mali59 and the Philippines as well).60  
This increasing use of drone strikes to go after individuals with more and more tenuous 
links to Al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks pushes the furthest boundaries of Congress’ 2011 
Authorization for use of Military Force. The AUMF authorized the president to “[U]se all 
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international 
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.”  
The AUMF’s language appears to restrict the use of force both with regard to who can be 
targeted (those with some culpability for the 9/11 attacks) and with regard to the purpose for 
which force is used (to prevent future attacks against the U.S.). As drone strikes expand beyond 
Al Qaeda targets (to go after, for instance, suspected members of Somalia’s al Shabaab), it grows 
increasingly difficult to justify such strikes under the AUMF. Do we believe al Shabaab was in 
any way culpable for the 9/11 attacks? Do we believe al Shabaab, an organization with primarily 
local and regional ambitions, has the desire or capability to engage in acts of international 
terrorism against the United States? 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 See http://articles.cnn.com/2012-09-05/opinion/opinion_bergen-obama-drone_1_drone-strikes-drone-attacks-drone-program 
56 See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/20/AR2011022002975.html 
57 See http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones 
58 See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/20/AR2011022002975.html 
59 See http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2012/06/did_the_us_launch_a_drone_stri.php 
60 See http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/03/05-drones-philippines-ahmed 
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3. The true costs of current US drone policy 
When we come to rely excessively on drone strikes as a counterterrorism tool, this has 
potential costs of its own. Drones strikes enable a "short-term fix" approach to counterterrorism, 
one that relies excessively on eliminating specific individuals deemed to be a threat, without 
much discussion of whether this strategy is likely to produce long-term security gains.  
Most counter-terrorism experts agree that in the long-term, terrorist organizations are 
rarely defeated militarily. Instead, terrorist groups fade away when they lose the support of the 
populations within which they work. They die out when their ideological underpinnings come 
undone – when new recruits stop appearing—when the communities in which they work stop 
providing active or passive forms of assistance—when local leaders speak out against them and 
residents report their activities and identities to the authorities.  
A comprehensive counterterrorist strategy recognizes this, and therefore relies heavily on 
activities intended to undermine terrorist credibility within populations, as well as on activities 
designed to disrupt terrorist communications and financing. Much of the time, these are the 
traditional tools of intelligence and law enforcement. Kinetic force undeniably has a role to play 
in counterterrorism in certain circumstances, but it is rarely a magic bullet. 
In addition, overreliance on kinetic tools at the expense of other approaches can be 
dangerous. Drone strikes -- lawful or not, justifiable or not – can have the unintended 
consequence of increasing both regional instability and anti-American sentiment. Drone strikes 
sow fear among the "guilty" and the innocent alike,61 and the use of drones in Pakistan and 
Yemen has increasingly been met with both popular and diplomatic protests. Indeed, drone 
strikes are increasingly causing dismay and concern within the U.S. population. 
As the Obama administration increases its reliance on drone strikes as the 
counterterrorism tool of choice, it is hard not to wonder whether we have begun to trade tactical 
gains for strategic losses. What impact will U.S. drone strikes ultimately have on the stability of 
Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia?62 To what degree -- especially as we reach further and further 
down the terrorist food chain, killing small fish who may be motivated less by ideology than 
economic desperation -- are we actually creating new grievances within the local population – or 
even within diaspora populations here in the United States?63 As Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld asked during the Iraq war, are we creating terrorists faster than we kill them?64 
At the moment, there is little evidence that U.S. drone policy – or individual drone 
strikes—result from a comprehensive assessment of strategic costs and benefits, as opposed to a 
shortsighted determination to strike targets of opportunity, regardless of long-term impact. As a 
military acquaintance of mine memorably put it, drone strikes remain “a tactic in search of a 
strategy.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 See http://www.economist.com/node/21561927 
62 See http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/05/al-qaida-drone-attacks-too-broad 
63 See http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-yemen-us-airstrikes-breed-anger-and-sympathy-for-al-
qaeda/2012/05/29/gJQAUmKI0U_story.html 
64 See http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm 
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4. Drones and the rule of law 
Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn now to the legal framework applicable to U.S. drone 
strikes. Both the United States and the international community have long had rules governing 
armed conflicts and the use of force in national self-defense. These rules apply whether the lethal 
force at issue involves knives, handguns, grenades or weaponized drones. When drone 
technologies are used in traditional armed conflicts—on “hot battlefields” such as those in 
Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya, for instance – they pose no new legal issues. As Administration 
officials have stated, their use is subject to the same requirements as the use of other lawful 
means and methods of warfare.65 
But if drones used in traditional armed conflicts or traditional self-defense situations 
present no “new” legal issues, some of the activities and policies enabled and facilitated by 
drone technologies pose significant challenges to existing legal frameworks.  
As I have discussed above, the availability of perceived low cost of drone technologies 
makes it far easier for the U.S. to “expand the battlefield,” striking targets in places where it 
would be too dangerous or too politically controversial to send troops. Specifically, drone 
technologies enable the United States to strike targets deep inside foreign states, and do so 
quickly, efficiently and deniably. As a result, drones have become the tool of choice for so-called 
“targeted killing” – the deliberate targeting of an individual or group of individuals, whether 
known by name or targeted based on patterns of activity, inside the borders of a foreign country. 
It is when drones are used in targeted killings outside of traditional or “hot” battlefields that their 
use challenges existing legal frameworks.   
Law is almost always out of date: we make legal rules based on existing conditions and 
technologies, perhaps with a small nod in the direction of predicted future changes. As societies 
and technologies change, law increasingly becomes an exercise in jamming square pegs into 
round holes. Eventually, that process begins to do damage to existing law: it gets stretched out of 
shape, or broken. Right now, I would argue, U.S. drone policy is on the verge of doing 
significant damage to the rule of law. 
A. The Rule of Law  
At root, the idea of “rule of law” is fairly simple, and well understood by Americans 
familiar with the foundational documents that established our nation, such as the Declaration of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 See http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf; Harold H. Koh, Keynote Address at 
the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington, DC (Mar. 25, 2010), Eric Holder, Address at 
Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, IL (Mar. 5, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-
speech-1203051.html.http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.; John O. Brennan, Address at Program on Law and 
Security, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA: Strengthening our Security by Adhering to our Values and Laws (Sep. 16, 
2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-
our-values-an; John O. Brennan, Address at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC: The Ethics 
and Efficacy of the president’s Counterterrorism Strategy (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-
ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy. 
APPENDIX  
TO  MAY  16,  2012  STATEMENT  FOR  THE  RECORD  SUBMITTED  TO  THE  SENATE  COMMITTEE  ON  ARMED  SERVICES  BY  ROSA  BROOKS  
  	  
	   ix	  
Independence, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The rule of law requires that governments 
follow transparent, clearly defined and universally applicable laws and procedures. The goal of 
the rule of law is to ensure predictability and stability, and to prevent the arbitrary exercise of 
power. In a society committed to the rule of law, the government cannot fine you, lock you up, or 
kill you on a whim -- it can restrict your liberty or take your property or life only in accordance 
with pre-established processes and rules that reflect basic notions of justice, humanity and 
fairness. 
Precisely what constitutes a fair process is debatable, but most would agree that at a 
minimum, fairness requires that individuals have reasonable notice of what constitutes the 
applicable law, reasonable notice that they are suspected of violating the law, a reasonable 
opportunity to rebut any allegations against them, and a reasonable opportunity to have the 
outcome of any procedures or actions against them reviewed by some objective person or body.  
These core values are enshrined both in the U.S. Constitution and in international human rights 
law instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the 
United States is a party.  
In ordinary circumstances, this bundle of universally acknowledged rights (together with 
international law principles of sovereignty) means it is clearly unlawful for one state to target 
and kill an individual inside the borders of another state. Recall, for instance, the 1976 killing of 
Chilean dissident Orlando Letelier in Washington DC. When Chilean government intelligence 
operatives planted a car bomb in the car used by Letelier, killing him and a U.S. citizen 
accompanying him, the United States government called this an act of murder—an unlawful 
political assassination.  
B. Targeted Killing and the Law of Armed Conflict  
Of course, sometimes the “ordinary” legal rules do not apply. In war, the willful killing of 
human beings is permitted, whether the means of killing is a gun, a bomb, or a long-distance 
drone strike.  The law of armed conflict permits a wide range of behaviors that would be 
unlawful in the absence of an armed conflict. Generally speaking, the intentional destruction of 
private property and severe restrictions on individual liberties are impermissible in peacetime, 
but acceptable in wartime, for instance. Even actions that a combatant knows will cause civilian 
deaths are lawful when consistent with the principles of necessity, humanity, proportionality,66 
and distinction.67  
It is worth briefly explaining these principles. The principle of necessity requires parties 
to a conflict to limit their actions to those that are indispensible for securing the complete 
submission of the enemy as soon as possible (and that are otherwise permitted by international 
law). The principle of humanity forbids parties to a conflict to inflict gratuitous violence or 
employ methods calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.  The principle of proportionality 
requires parties to ensure that the anticipated loss of life or property incidental to an attack is not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 See generally the U.S. Army’s Operational Law Handbook, 2012, at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/operational-
law-handbook_2012.pdf ; http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter4_rule14 
67 See generally the U.S. Army’s Operational Law Handbook, 2012, at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/operational-
law-handbook_2012.pdf ; http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule1 
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excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.  
Finally, the principle of discrimination or distinction requires that parties to a conflict direct their 
actions only against combatants and military objectives, and take appropriate steps to distinguish 
between combatants and non-combatants.68 
This is a radical oversimplification of a very complex body of law.69 But as with the rule 
of law, the basic idea is pretty simple. When there is no war -- when ordinary, peacetime law 
applies -- agents of the state aren't supposed to lock people up, take their property or kill them, 
unless they have jumped through a whole lot of legal hoops first. When there is an armed 
conflict, however, everything changes. War is not a legal free-for-all70 -- torture, rape are always 
crimes under the law of war, as is killing that is willful, wanton and not justified by military 
necessity71 -- but there are far fewer constraints on state behavior. 
Technically, the law of war is referred to using the Latin term “lex specialis” – special 
law. It is applicable in—and only in -- special circumstances (in this case, armed conflict), and in 
those special circumstances, it supersedes “ordinary law,” or “lex generalis,” the “general law” 
that prevails in peacetime. We have one set of laws for “normal” situations, and another, more 
flexible set of laws for “extraordinary” situations, such as armed conflicts. 
None of this poses any inherent problem for the rule of law. Having one body of rules 
that tightly restricts the use of force and another body of rules that is far more permissive does 
not fundamentally undermine the rule of law, as long as we have a reasonable degree of 
consensus on what circumstances trigger the “special” law, and as long as the “special law” 
doesn’t end up undermining the general law. 
To put it a little differently, war, with its very different rules, does not challenge ordinary 
law as long as war is the exception, not the norm --  as long as we can all agree on what 
constitutes a war -- as long as we can tell when the war begins and ends -- and as long as we all 
know how to tell the difference between a combatant and a civilian, and between places where 
there's war and places where there's no war. 
Let me return now to the question of drones and targeted killings. When all these 
distinctions I just mentioned are clear, the use of drones in targeted killings does not necessarily 
present any great or novel problem. In Libya, for instance, a state of armed conflict clearly 
existed inside the borders of Libya between Libyan government forces and NATO states. In that 
context, the use of drones to strike Libyan military targets is no more controversial than the use 
of manned aircraft.  
That is because our core rule of law concerns have mostly been satisfied: we know there 
is an armed conflict, in part because all parties to it agree that there is an armed conflict, in part 
because observers (such as international journalists) can easily verify the presence of uniformed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 See generally the U.S. Army’s Operational Law Handbook, 2012, at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/operational-
law-handbook_2012.pdf 
69 See http://ihl.ihlresearch.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewpage&pageid=2083 
70 See http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2441 
71 See http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/iccelementsofcrimes.html 
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military personnel engaged in using force, and in part because the violence is, from an objective 
perspective, widespread and sustained: it is not a mere skirmish or riot or criminal law 
enforcement situation that got out of control. We know who the “enemy” is: Libyan government 
forces. We know where the conflict is and is not: the conflict was in Libya, but not in 
neighboring Algeria or Egypt. We know when the conflict began, we know who authorized the 
use of force (the UN Security Council) and, just as crucially, we know whom to hold 
accountable in the event of error or abuse (the various governments involved).72 
Once you take targeted killings outside hot battlefields, it’s a different story. The Obama 
Administration is currently using drones to strike terror suspects in Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, 
and –perhaps—Mali and the Philippines as well. Defenders of the administration's increasing 
reliance on drone strikes in such places assert that the U.S. is in an armed conflict with “al Qaeda 
and its associates,” and on that basis, they assert that the law of war is applicable -- in any place 
and at any time -- with regard to any person the administration deems a combatant.  
The trouble is, no one outside a very small group within the U.S. executive branch has 
any ability to evaluate who is and who isn’t a combatant. The war against al Qaeda and its 
associates is not like World War II, or Libya, or even Afghanistan: it is an open-ended conflict 
with an inchoate, undefined adversary (who exactly are al Qaeda’s “associates”?). What is more, 
targeting decisions in this nebulous “war” are based largely on classified intelligence reporting. 
As a result, Administration assertions about who is a combatant and what constitutes a threat are 
entirely non-falsifiable, because they're based wholly on undisclosed evidence. Add to this still 
another problem: most of these strikes are considered covert action, so although the U.S. 
sometimes takes public credit for the deaths of alleged terrorist leaders, most of the time, the 
U.S. will not even officially acknowledge targeted killings. 
This leaves all the key rule-of-law questions related to the ongoing war against al Qaeda 
and its "associates" unanswered.73 Based on what criteria might someone be considered a 
combatant or directly participating in hostilities? What constitutes “hostilities” in the context of 
an armed conflict against a non-state actor, and what does it mean to participate in them? And 
just where is the war? Does the war (and thus the law of war) somehow "travel" with 
combatants? Does the U.S. have a “right” to target enemy combatants anywhere on earth, or does 
it depend on the consent of the state at issue? Who in the United States government is authorized 
to make such determinations, and what is the precise chain of command for such decisions? 
I think the rule of law problem here is obvious: when “armed conflict” becomes a term 
flexible enough to be applied both to World War II and to the relations between the United States 
and “associates” of al Qaeda such as Somalia’s al Shabaab, the concept of armed conflict is not 
very useful anymore. And when we lack clarity and consensus on how to recognize “armed 
conflict,” we no longer have a clear or principled basis for deciding how to categorize U.S. 
targeted killings.  Are they, as the U.S. government argues, legal under the laws of war? Or are 
they, as some human rights groups have argued, unlawful murder?  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 In my previous scholarly work, I have written extensively about the challenges posed by geographically dispersed terrorist 
organizations to traditional legal categories. See, e.g., Rosa Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, And The 
Law Of Armed Conflict In The Age Of Terror, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 675 (2004). 
73 See http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/19/q-us-targeted-killings-and-international-law 
APPENDIX  
TO  MAY  16,  2012  STATEMENT  FOR  THE  RECORD  SUBMITTED  TO  THE  SENATE  COMMITTEE  ON  ARMED  SERVICES  BY  ROSA  BROOKS  
  	  
	   xii	  
C. Targeted Killing and the International Law of Self-Defense 
When faced with criticisms of the law of war framework as a justification for targeted 
killing, Obama Administration representatives often shift tack, arguing that international law 
rules on national self-defense provide an alternative or additional legal justification for U.S. 
targeted killings. Here, the argument is that if a person located in a foreign state poses an 
"imminent threat of violent attack" against the United States, the U.S. can lawfully use force in 
self-defense, provided that the defensive force used is otherwise consistent with law of war 
principles.  
Like law of war-based arguments, this general principle is superficially uncontroversial: 
if someone overseas is about to launch a nuclear weapon at New York City, no one can doubt 
that the United States has a perfect right (and the president has a constitutional duty) to use force 
if needed to prevent that attack, regardless of the attacker's nationality. 
But once again, the devil is in the details. To start with, what constitutes an "imminent" 
threat? Traditionally, both international law and domestic criminal law understand that term 
narrowly: 74 to be "imminent," a threat cannot be distant or speculative.75 But much like the Bush 
Administration before it, the Obama Administration has put forward an interpretation of the 
word “imminent” that bears little relation to traditional legal concepts.  
According to a leaked 2011 Justice Department white paper76—the most detailed legal 
justification that has yet become public-- the requirement of imminence "does not require the 
United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take 
place in the immediate future." This seems, in itself, like a substantial departure from accepted 
international law definitions of imminence.  
But the White Paper goes even further, stating that "certain members of al Qaeda are 
continually plotting attacks...and would engage in such attacks regularly [if] they were able to do 
so, [and] the U.S. government may not be aware of all... plots as they are developing and thus 
cannot be confident that none is about to occur." For this reason, it concludes, anyone deemed to 
be an operational leader of al Qaeda or its "associated forces" presents, by definition, an 
imminent threat even in the absence of any evidence whatsoever relating to immediate or future 
attack plans. In effect, the concept of "imminent threat" (part of the international law relating to 
self-defense) becomes conflated with identity or status (a familiar part of the law of armed 
conflict).   
That concept of imminence has been called Orwellian, and although that is an overused 
epithet, in this context it seems fairly appropriate. According to the Obama Administration, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 The most restrictive traditional formulation of the term imminent in international law can be seen in the famous 1837 Exchange 
of letters between U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster and Lord Ashburton, Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, relating to the 
case of the SS Caroline, explaining “imminent attack” as one that is “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation.” More recent approaches have been somewhat more flexible. See, e.g, United Nations Secretary-
General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change: “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,” at 
http://www.un.org/secureworld/ 
75 See http://opiniojuris.org/2012/03/07/why-preventive-self-defense-violates-the-un-charter/ 
76 See http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf 
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“imminent” no longer means “immediate,” and in fact the very absence of clear evidence 
indicating specific present or future attack plans becomes, paradoxically, the basis for assuming 
that attack may perpetually be “imminent.” 
The 2011 Justice Department White Paper notes that the use of force in self-defense must 
comply with general law of war principles of necessity, proportionality, humanity, and 
distinction.  The White Paper offers no guidance on the specific criteria for determining when an 
individual is a combatant (or a civilian participating directly in hostilities), however. It also 
offers no guidance on how to determine if a use of force is necessary or proportionate.  
From a traditional international law perspective, this necessity and proportionality inquiry 
relates both to imminence and to the gravity of the threat itself, but so far there has been no 
public Administration statement as to how the administration interprets these requirements. Is 
any threat of "violent attack" sufficient to justify killing someone in a foreign country, including 
a U.S. citizen? Is every potential suicide bomber targetable, or does it depend on the gravity of 
the threat? Are we justified in drone strikes against targets who might, if they get a chance at 
some unspecified future point, place an IED that might, if successful, kill one person? Ten 
people? Twenty? 2,000? How grave a threat must there be to justify the use of lethal force 
against an American citizen abroad -- or against non-citizens, for that matter?  
As I have noted, it is impossible for outsiders to fully evaluate U.S. drone strikes, since so 
much vital information remains classified. In most cases, we know little about the identities; 
activities or future plans of those targeted. Nevertheless, given the increased frequency of U.S. 
targeted killings in recent years, it seems reasonable to wonder whether the Administration 
conducts a rigorous necessity or proportionality analysis in all cases.  
So far, the leaked 2011 Justice Department White Paper represents the most detailed legal 
analysis of targeted killings available to the public. It is worth noting, incidentally, that this 
White Paper addresses only the question of whether and when it is lawful for the U.S. 
government to target U.S. citizens abroad. We do not know what legal standards the 
Administration believes apply to the targeting of non-citizens. It seems reasonable to assume, 
however, that the standards applicable to non-citizens are less exacting than those the 
Administration views as applicable to citizens. 
Defenders of administration targeted killing policy acknowledge that the criteria for 
determining how to answer these many questions have not been made public, but insist that this 
should not be cause for concern. The Administration has reportedly developed a detailed 
“playbook” outlining the targeting criteria and procedures,77, and insiders insist that executive 
branch officials go through an elaborate process in which they carefully consider every possible 
issue before determining that a drone strike is lawful.78  
No doubt they do, but this is somewhat cold comfort. Formal processes tend to further 
normalize once-exceptional activities -- and "trust us" is a rather shaky foundation for the rule of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 See http://www.uta.edu/faculty/story/2311/Misc/2013,4,1,DronesTargetedKillingWhoCanWeKill.pdf;  
78 See http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm, http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-
1203051.html, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=all 
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law. Indeed, the whole point of the rule of law is that individual lives and freedom should not 
depend solely on the good faith and benevolence of government officials.  
As with law of war arguments, stating that U.S. targeted killings are clearly legal under 
traditional self-defense principles requires some significant cognitive dissonance. Law exists to 
restrain untrammeled power. It is no doubt possible to make a plausible legal argument justifying 
each and every U.S. drone strike -- but this merely suggests that we are working with a legal 
framework that has begun to outlive its usefulness.  
The real question isn't whether U.S. drone strikes are "legal." The real question is this: Do 
we really want to live in a world in which the U.S. government's justification for killing is so 
malleable? 
 
5. Setting Troubling International Precedents 
Here is an additional reason to worry about the U.S. overreliance on drone strikes: Other 
states will follow America's example, and the results are not likely to be pretty. Consider once 
again the Letelier murder, which was an international scandal in 1976: If the Letelier 
assassination took place today, the Chilean authorities would presumably insist on their national 
right to engage in “targeted killings” of individuals deemed to pose imminent threats to Chilean 
national security -- and they would justify such killings using precisely the same legal theories 
the U.S. currently uses to justify targeted killings in Yemen or Somalia. We should assume that 
governments around the world—including those with less than stellar human rights records, such 
as Russia and China—are taking notice. 
Right now, the United States has a decided technological advantage when it comes to 
armed drones, but that will not last long. We should use this window to advance a robust legal 
and normative framework that will help protect against abuses by those states whose leaders can 
rarely be trusted. Unfortunately, we are doing the exact opposite: Instead of articulating norms 
about transparency and accountability, the United States is effectively handing China, Russia, 
and every other repressive state a playbook for how to foment instability and –literally -- get 
away with murder. 
Take the issue of sovereignty. Sovereignty has long been a core concept of the 
Westphalian international legal order.79 In the international arena, all sovereign states are 
formally considered equal and possessed of the right to control their own internal affairs free of 
interference from other states. That's what we call the principle of non-intervention -- and it 
means, among other things, that it is generally prohibited for one state to use force inside the 
borders of another sovereign state. There are some well-established exceptions, but they are few 
in number. A state can lawfully use force inside another sovereign state with that state's 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 See http://www.towson.edu/polsci/irencyc/sovreign.htm 
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invitation or consent, or when force is authorized by the U.N. Security Council, pursuant to the 
U.N. Charter,80 or in self-defense "in the event of an armed attack." 
The 2011 Justice Department White Paper asserts that targeted killings carried out by the 
United States don't violate another state's sovereignty as long as that state either consents or is 
"unwilling or unable to suppress the threat posed by the individual being targeted." That sounds 
superficially plausible, but since the United States views itself as the sole arbiter of whether a 
state is "unwilling or unable" to suppress that threat, the logic is in fact circular.  
It goes like this: The United States -- using its own malleable definition of "imminent" -- 
decides that Person X, residing in sovereign State Y, poses a threat to the United States and 
requires killing. Once the United States decides that Person X can be targeted, the principle of 
sovereignty presents no barriers, because either 1) State Y will consent to the U.S. use of force 
inside its borders, in which case the use of force presents no sovereignty problems or 2) State Y 
will not consent to the U.S. use of force inside its borders, in which case, by definition, the 
United States will deem State Y to be "unwilling or unable to suppress the threat" posed by 
Person X and the use of force again presents no problem. 
This is a legal theory that more or less eviscerates traditional notions of sovereignty, and 
has the potential to significantly destabilize the already shaky collective security regime created 
by the U.N. Charter.81 If the U.S. is the sole arbiter of whether and when it can use force inside 
the borders of another state, any other state strong enough to get away with it is likely to claim 
similar prerogatives. And, of course, if the U.S. executive branch is the sole arbiter of what 
constitutes an imminent threat and who constitutes a targetable enemy combatant in an ill-
defined war, why shouldn’t other states make identical arguments—and use them to justify the 
killing of dissidents, rivals, or unwanted minorities? 
 
6. Towards solutions: ensuring that US targeted killing policy does not undermine the 
rule of law. 
I have suggested in this testimony that while the law of war and the international law of 
self-defense may provide justification for U.S. targeted killing policy, it is, in practice, difficult 
to say for sure. This is because decisions about who is a combatant, what threats are imminent 
and so on are inherently fact specific. Since U.S. targeted killings take place under a cloak of 
secrecy, it is impossible for outsiders to evaluate the facts or apply the law to specific facts.  
I have also suggested that we face a problem that is deeper still: we are attempting to 
apply old law to novel situations.  As I noted earlier, the law of war evolved in response to 
traditional armed conflicts, and cannot be easily applied to relations between states and 
geographically diffuse non-state terrorist organizations.  When we try to apply the law of war to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 See http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml 
81 See generally Rosa Brooks, Be Careful What You Wish For: Changing Doctrines, Changing Technologies, and the Lower Cost 
of War, 106 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 106 (2012) and The Strange Convergence of Sovereignty-Limiting Doctrines in Human 
Rights and National Security Law Discourses, Georgetown  J. Int’l Affairs, Issue 13-2, 2012. 
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modern terrorist threats, we encounter numerous translation problems. Most disturbingly, it 
becomes nearly impossible to make a principled decision about when the law of war is 
applicable in the first place, and when it is not.  
As I noted earlier, law is almost always out of date: legal rules are made based on the 
conditions and technologies existing at the time, and as societies and technologies change, law 
increasingly becomes an exercise in jamming square pegs into round holes. Up to a point, this 
works, but eventually, that process begins to do damage to existing law: it gets stretched out of 
shape, or broken. At that point, we need to update our laws and practices before too much 
damage is done. 
This is a daunting project, and I do not have any simple solutions to offer. In a sense, the 
struggle to adapt old legal frameworks and institutions to radically new situations will be the 
work of generations. But the complexity of the problem should not be an excuse for ignoring it. 
In that spirit, I will suggest several potential means to improve on the existing state of affairs and 
enhance oversight, transparency and accountability. Congress can implement some of these 
recommendations, while others would require Administration acquiescence. Fully evaluating the 
pros and cons of potential reforms is beyond the scope of this testimony, but I hope that this will 
be the subject of future hearings. 
1. Congress should encourage Administration transparency and public debate by continuing 
to hold hearings on targeted killing policy, its relationship to (and impact on) broader 
U.S. counterterrorism, national security and foreign policy goals, and appropriate 
mechanisms for improving oversight, accountability and conformity to U.S. rule of law 
values. Congress should also consider hearings on the longer-term challenge of adapting 
the law of war and law of self-defense to 21st century threats. 
2. Congress should also encourage Administration transparency through the imposition of 
reporting requirements. Congress could require that the executive branch provide 
thorough reports on any uses of force not expressly authorized by Congress and/or 
outside specified regions, and require that such reports contain both classified sections 
and unclassified sections in which the Administration provides a legal and policy analysis 
of any use of force in self-defense or other uses of force outside traditional battlefields.  
3. Congress should consider repealing the 2001 AUMF. The Obama administration’s 
domestic legal justification for most drone strikes relies on the AUMF, which it interprets 
to authorize the use of force not only against those individuals and organizations with 
some real connection to the 9/11 attacks, but also against all “associates” of al Qaeda. 
This flexible interpretation of the AUMF creates few constraints, and has lowered the 
threshold for using force. Repealing the AUMF would not deprive the president of the 
ability to use force if necessary to prevent or respond to a serious armed attack: the 
president would retain his existing discretionary power, as chief executive and 
commander in chief, to protect the nation in emergencies. Repealing the 2001 AUMF 
would, however, likely reduce the frequency with which the president resorts to targeted 
killings. 
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4. The Constitution gives Congress the power to “define and punish offenses against the law 
of nations.” Without tying the president’s hands, Congress can pass a resolution 
clarifying that the international law of self-defense requires a rigorous imminence, 
necessity and proportionality analysis, and that the use of cross-border military force 
should be reserved for situations in which there is concrete evidence of grave threats to 
the United States or our allies that cannot be addressed through other means.  
5. Congress and/or the Executive branch should create a non-partisan blue ribbon 
commission made up of senior experts on international law, national security, human 
rights, foreign policy and counterterrorism. Commission members should have or receive 
the necessary clearances to review intelligence reports and conduct a thorough policy 
review of past and current targeted killing policy, evaluating the risk of setting 
international precedents, the impact of U.S. targeted killing policy on allies, and the 
impact on broader U.S. counterterrorism goals.  
In the absence of a judicial review mechanism, such a commission might also be tasked 
with reviewing particular strikes to determine whether any errors or abuses have taken 
place. The commission should release a public, unclassified report as well as a classified 
report made available to executive branch and congressional officials, and the report 
should continue detailed recommendations, including, if applicable, recommendations for 
changes in law and policy and recommendations for further action of any sort, including, 
potentially, compensation for civilians harmed by U.S. drone strikes. The unclassified 
report should contain as few redactions as possible. 
6. Congress should urge the president to publicly acknowledge all targeted killings outside 
traditional battlefield within a reasonable time period, identifying those who were 
targeted, laying out  (with the minimal number of appropriate redactions) the legal and 
factual basis for the decision to target, and identifying, to the best of available 
knowledge, death, property damage and injury resulting from the strike(s).  
7. Congress should urge the president to release unclassified versions of all legal 
memoranda relating to targeted killing policy. In particular, U.S. citizens have a right to 
understand the government’s views on the legality of targeting U.S. citizens; there is no 
conceivable justification for failing to make this information public. 
8. Congress should urge the president to also provide the public with information about the 
process through which targeting decisions outside traditional battlefields are made, the 
chain of command for such decisions, and internal procedures designed to prevent 
civilian casualties. Most military operational and legal manuals are publicly available, 
and this issue should be no different. If reports of a targeted killing “playbook” are 
accurate, an unclassified version should be released to the public. 
9. Congress should urge the administration should convene, through appropriate diplomatic 
and track II channels, an international dialogue on norms governing the use of drone 
technologies and targeted killings.  The goal should be to develop consensus and a code 
of conduct on the legal principles applicable to targeted killing outside a state’s territory, 
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including those relating to sovereignty, proportionality and distinction, and on 
appropriate procedural safeguards to prevent and redress error and abuse.  
10. Congress should consider creating a judicial mechanism, perhaps similar to the existing 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, to authorize and review the legality of targeted 
killings outside of traditional battlefields. While the Administration may argue that such 
targeting decisions present non-justiciable political questions because of the president’s 
commander-in-chief authority, the use of military force outside of traditional battlefields 
and against geographically dispersed non-state actors straddles the lines between war and 
law enforcement. While the president must clearly be granted substantial discretion in the 
context of armed conflicts, the applicability of the law of armed conflict to a particular 
situation requires that the law be interpreted and applied to a particular factual situation, 
and this is squarely the type of inquiry the judiciary is bested suited to making.  
It is also worth noting that the practical concerns militating against justiciability in the 
context of traditional wartime situations do not exist to the same degree here. On 
traditional battlefields, imposing due process or judicial review requirements on targeting 
decisions would be unduly burdensome, as many targeting decisions must be made in 
situations of extreme urgency. In the context of targeted killings outside traditional 
battlefields, this is rarely the case. While the window of opportunity in which to strike a 
given target may be brief and urgent, decisions about whether an individual may lawfully 
be targeted are generally made well in advance. 
 
A judicial mechanism designed to ensure that U.S. targeted killing policy complies with 
U.S. law and the law of armed conflict might take any of several forms. Most 
controversially, a court might be tasked with the ex ante determination of whether a 
particular individual could lawfully be targeted.  
 
This approach is likely to be strenuously resisted by the Administration on separation of 
powers grounds, and it also raises potential issues about whether the Constitution’s case 
and controversy requirement could be satisfied, insofar as proceedings before such a 
judicial body would, of necessity, be in camera and ex parte.82 This is also true for the 
existing FISA court, however, and its procedures have generally been upheld on Fourth 
Amendment grounds. It would seem odd to permit ex parte proceedings in an effort to 
ensure judicial approval for surveillance, but reject such proceedings as insufficiently 
protective of individual rights when an individual has been selected for lethal targeting 
rather than mere search and seizure.  
 
I believe it would be possible to design an ex ante judicial mechanism that would pass 
constitutional and practical muster. It would be complex and controversial, however, and 
there is an alternative approach that might offer many of the same benefits with far fewer 
of the difficulties. This alternative approach would be to develop a judicial mechanism 
that conducts a post hoc review of targeted killings, perhaps through a statute creating a 
cause of action for damages for those claiming wrongful injury or death as a result of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 See http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/why-a-drone-court-wont-work/ 
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unlawful targeted killing operations. This would add additional incentives for executive 
branch officials to abide by the law, without placing the judiciary in the troubling role of 
authorizing or rejecting the use of military force in advance. While proceedings might 
need to be conducted at least partially in camera, judicial decisions in these cases could 
be released in redacted form.  
 
It is not possible for this testimony to fully address the many permutations of potential 
judicial review mechanisms for targeted killing, but I hope this is an issue that will 
generate further discussion and inquiry in this sub-committee. To that end, it is worth 
noting that the notion of judicial review of targeted killing is one that has been validated 
by the courts of one of our closest allies, Israel.  
 
The Israeli Supreme Court addressed the issue of targeted killing in a 2006 decision, and 
roundly rejected the view that targeted killing presents a non-justiciable issue.83 The 
court insisted that the legality of each targeted killing decision must be individually 
considered in light of domestic and international legal requirements. It determined that 
while the conflict between Israel and Palestinian terrorist organizations was an 
international armed conflict, individual terrorist suspects were civilians who become 
targetable by virtue (and only by virtue) of their direct participation in hostilities, a 
concept the court analyzed in detail. The court also noted that international law requires 
independent investigations when civilians are targeted because of their suspected 
participation in hostilities. While specific judicial review mechanisms in the U.S. might 
reasonably be expected to vary from those in place in Israel, the Israeli experience 
strongly suggests that there is no inherent reason judicial review of targeted killings could 
not occur.  
 
Conclusion 
Mr. Chairman, Senator Cruz and members and staff of the subcommittee, we need to start 
talking honestly about drones, the activities they enable and the strategic and legal frameworks in 
which these activities take place. Drone critics need to end their irrational insistence on viewing 
drones as somehow inherently “immoral.” But drone strike boosters also need to engage in a 
more honest conversation, and grapple with the argument that although drone strikes appear to 
offer cheap and low-risk “quick fix” approach to counterterrorism, they may well be doing the 
U.S. as much harm as good.  
In particular, we need to address the rule of law implications of U.S. targeted killing 
policy. Every individual detained, targeted, and killed by the U.S. government may well deserve 
his fate. But when a government claims for itself the unreviewable power to kill anyone, 
anywhere on earth, at any time, based on secret criteria and secret information discussed in a 
secret process by largely unnamed individuals, it undermines the rule of law. 	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One can argue, as the Obama Administration does, that current U.S. drone policy is 
entirely lawful, and perhaps this is so, if we’re willing to take virtually everything about the 
strikes on faith, and don’t mind jamming square pegs into round holes. But "legality" is not the 
same as morality or common sense. Current U.S. drone policy offers no safeguards against abuse 
or error, and sets a dangerous precedent that other states are sure to exploit. 
Thank you once again for affording me this opportunity to testify.  There is nothing 
preordained about how we use new technologies, but by lowering the perceived costs of using 
lethal force, drone technologies enable a particularly invidious sort of mission creep. When 
covert killings are the rare exception, they do not pose a fundamental challenge to the legal, 
moral, and political framework in which we live. But when covert killings become a routine and 
ubiquitous tool of U.S. foreign policy, we cannot afford to let them remain in the legal and moral 
shadows.  
We need an honest conversation about how to bring targeted killings under a rule of law 
umbrella, by creating more transparent rules and more robust checks and balances. I am grateful 
to all of you for helping to foster such an honest conversation. 
 
 
